Economic governance and the evolution of industrial districts under globalization: the case of two mature European industrial districts by Sacchetti, Silvia & Tomlinson, Philip R.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Economic governance and the evolution of industrial
districts under globalization: the case of two mature
European industrial districts
Journal Item
How to cite:
Sacchetti, Silvia and Tomlinson, Philip R. (2009). Economic governance and the evolution of industrial districts
under globalization: the case of two mature European industrial districts. European Planning Studies, 17(12) pp.
1837–1859.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2009 Taylor Francis
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/09654310903322355
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Economic governance and the evolution of industrial districts 
under globalisation: the case of two mature European 
industrial districts 
 
 
Silvia Sacchetti 
The Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham (UK) and 
Democratic Communities in Academic Research on Economic Development 
(DARE) 
 
Email: s.sacchetti@bham.ac.uk 
 
 
Philip R. Tomlinson 
School of Management, University of Bath (UK) and Democratic 
Communities in Academic Research on Economic Development (DARE) 
 
Email: P.R.Tomlinson@bath.ac.uk  
 
 
Address for Correspondance: 
School of Management 
University of Bath  
Bath, BA2 7AY 
Tel: +44 (0) 1225 383798 
Email: P.R.Tomlinson@bath.ac.uk  
 
 
October 2008 
 
 
Abstract 
 
For many mature European industrial districts, the present decade has been 
one of trying (and often failing) to meet the difficult challenges posed by the 
rising tide of globalisation. The future of these districts in the new global 
economy has become a key issue for regional and local development policy, 
and, in this respect, it has sparked a renewed interest in economic governance. 
Economic governance is important in that it underpins a region‟s long term 
economic development path. This paper is a contribution to the study of the 
economic governance of industrial districts and the related policy debate. The 
paper does so by specifically exploring the economic governance issue by 
considering the experiences and challenges currently facing two mature 
European industrial districts in the global economy.    
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1.0 Introduction 
 
For many mature European industrial districts, the present decade has been 
one of trying (and often failing) to meet the challenges posed by the rising tide 
of globalisation. Indeed, in many European regions, the growth in 
international competition - mainly from low cost operators in the Far East - 
and the increased use of global outsourcing by district firms, has often had a 
painful impact upon local industry and employment levels, raising serious 
concerns of industrial „hollowing out‟. Not surprisingly, the future of these 
mature European districts in the new global economy has become a key issue 
for regional development policy.    
 
The policy debates on dealing with the effects of globalisation and structural 
change within regions have been wide ranging. Most policy initiatives have 
emanated from the substantive work in the academic literature, from the late 
1980s onwards, which have highlighted the competitiveness of particular 
industrial districts (and regional clusters) in the new global economy (see, for 
instance, Beccattini, 1978, 1991, Best, 1990, 2001, Markusen, 1996, 2003, 
Porter, 1990, 1998). In some quarters, the promotion of regionalism and 
„cluster targeting‟ has become regarded as a useful antidote to the 
displacement effects of globalisation, with regions striving to retain and attract 
highly productive firms (in Markusen‟s (1996) parlance, to become a „sticky 
place‟). In recent years – at least in some European policy circles (see Section 
4) - there has been a renewed interest in the organisation of production within 
districts and the role of inter-firm networking in regional economic 
development. These issues relate to the concept of economic governance, a 
salient issue which has largely been underplayed or even ignored in the 
mainstream literature (Alberti, 2001, Sugden and Wilson, 2006).  
 
The term „governance‟ is widely used in the literature. According to Le Gales 
and Voelzkow (2001: 6-7) governance „refers to the entirety of institutions 
which co-ordinate or regulate action or transactions among subjects within a 
system‟. These authors then identify the main components of a governance 
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system as the market, the (business) organisation or firm, the state, the 
community and associations of shared interests (such as local business 
consortia or trade unions). While exploring these separate (and related) 
components undoubtedly offers invaluable insights into governance processes 
within localities, our aim in this paper is to primarily focus upon the economic 
governance of firms and inter-firm relationships within industrial districts. 
This is because, as Coase (1937) suggested, firms can be seen as „islands of 
planning‟ whose choices, however, can impact on other economic actors. 
Besides, depending on their networking strategies firms do not „plan‟ or act in 
complete „isolation‟. A key issue is the distribution of economic power among 
constituent firms and its implications for strategic decision making processes 
within the district, since this influences the district‟s development path.  
 
In exploring these issues we consider the experiences and challenges currently 
facing two old European industrial districts in the global economy. The cases 
chosen are both mature districts: the North Staffordshire ceramics district, in 
the UK and the Prato textile district, based in Tuscany. Both regions have a 
long historical association with their respective industries. We will argue that 
as the economic structure of districts are becoming more hierarchical, an 
understanding of economic governance and the nature of relationships 
between actors within a district is crucial for the design of appropriate policy 
and for ensuring sustainable economic development.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section (2), we explore the 
issue of economic governance, carefully distinguishing between hierarchical 
modes of economic governance („networks of direction‟) and more 
heterarchical modes („networks of mutual dependence‟). We argue that the 
nature of a district‟s governance structure has implications for its development 
path, and this point is explored further in Section (3), where we consider the 
literature in relation to district evolution. In Section (4) we introduce our case 
studies, where we draw upon qualitative insights and secondary data to 
highlight the implications of changing governance structures for development 
within our two traditional industrial districts. Finally, Section (5) concludes.   
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2.0 Economic Governance in Industrial Districts: Networks of direction 
Versus Networks of mutual dependence   
 
Our interest in the economic governance of an industrial district is primarily 
concerned with gaining an understanding of the economic structure of the 
district and in particular the nature of relationships between constituent firms. 
The key issue is the distribution of economic power among firms, in particular 
what it entails, where it resides and how it might be exercised. At the firm 
level, economic power essentially involves the ability to take and 
subsequently implement strategic decisions which determine its broad 
business orientation (Zeitlin, 1974). A significant element in formulating these 
strategic decisions is that of economic planning which for Coase (1937), was 
the central feature of the firm‟s internal (strategic) decision-making processes: 
indeed, Coase regarded firms as „islands of planning‟. The ability to plan 
employment/output levels and undertake activities such as new capital 
investments or relocating production might (therefore) be considered as an 
expression of a firm‟s economic power although in reality, a firm‟s pursuit of 
such objectives may be constrained by it‟s external environment (either 
through government regulation and/or the behaviour and activities of other 
firms with which it interacts).   
 
The extent to which a firm can implement its own strategic decisions will 
ultimately depend upon the distribution of economic power among related 
actors and here there is no guarantee that such power will be evenly 
distributed (see Palermo, 2000). Indeed, economic power asymmetries are 
likely to prove to be the norm rather than the exception
1
. Consequently, the 
more powerful actors might be expected to use their position to further their 
own strategic interests, possibly to the detriment of others (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1998). For instance, smaller firms might find themselves being 
„closed out‟ of markets because of the anti-competitive strategies of larger 
competitors or they might be coerced into accepting an iniquitous set of 
                                                 
1
 This seems particularly the case given the rising levels of industrial concentration (and the 
associated concentration of economic power) which are widely observed around the world 
(for recent evidence see Cowling and Tomlinson, 2005).  
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contract conditions from a large powerful contractor. Such power asymmetries 
can have important implications for the future development of a district or 
region.  
 
In exploring the implications of the distribution of economic power within 
industrial districts it is useful to consider Sacchetti and Sugden‟s (2003) 
distinction between „networks of direction‟ and „networks of mutual 
dependence‟2. Each type of network represents the two ends of the spectrum 
in defining the nature of inter-firm relationships. The first case relates to 
networks of firms where strategic decision-making and economic planning is 
concentrated among either one or possibly a few core firms
3
. Economic 
relations within „networks of direction‟ are predominantly hierarchical in the 
sense that the core firms independently pursue their own strategic objectives, 
often with little consultation with their trading partners and/or other 
stakeholders in the locality. Such a network might typically be observed in a 
vertical production chain, where there is either a monopsonistic buyer or seller 
which engages in activities with less empowered partner firms (such as 
smaller sub-contractors)
4
.  The terms of such engagements are often dictated 
by the dominant or core firm, with the smaller partners playing a largely 
subservient role, often being required to deliver lower production costs and 
meet tight (output) efficiency criteria. For such partner firms, there is little 
room for manoeuvre and few opportunities to influence the whole production 
process, which is geared towards serving the flexibility requirements of the 
                                                 
2
 Sacchetti and Sugden (2003) regard networks as being somewhat spatially looser and not 
necessarily confined within a geographical area. Nevertheless, the framework is useful here, 
particularly in the context of the current evolution of traditional industrial districts towards the 
„networks of direction‟ model (see Sections 3 and 4).   
3
 In Markusen‟s typology of clusters (1996), this might be considered as the „hub and spoke‟ 
cluster.  
4
 While our example here focuses upon vertical structures, this is not to say that hierarchical 
forms of economic governance do not arise in more horizontal industrial structures where 
there are less direct ties between particular firms. For instance, consider a district where there 
are one or two dominant oligopolistic firms, and which is supplemented with a group of 
smaller players within the same sector, who operate in their own niche markets (the so-called 
„competitive fringe‟). In such cases, the dominant firms, through their scale and scope can 
have a profound influence upon production and market outcomes and ultimately the strategic 
direction of the district, either directly in negotiations with other firms and/or involvement in 
local institutions or indirectly through their presence in both product and local labour markets 
(see the North Staffordshire case in Section 4).  
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core firms (which more often than not are the sole beneficiaries from the 
fragmentation of production) (see De Propris, 2001)
5
. 
 
The implications of the „networks of direction‟ model for the industrial district 
are mixed. On the positive side, the emergence of large dominant firms within 
a district may lead to new investment in technology on a scale which might 
not have been undertaken by smaller firms (Lazonick, 1993). This can lead to 
greater economies of scale, thus improving the district‟s competitiveness. A 
further advantage is that as core firms develop their own brand identities on a 
national and international scale, these may act as a source of demand for 
smaller district-based subcontractors. Indeed, the „brand identities‟ of 
particular firms could, over time, become synonymous with the district itself, 
with positive spillovers such as attracting new firm entry into the district and 
the promotion of industrial tourism.          
     
On the other hand, the „networks of direction‟ model raises particular 
concerns for the industrial district. These primarily relate to the district 
becoming „locked in‟ to the objectives and strategic decision making 
processes of a few or even a single firm. In such circumstances, the district‟s 
outlook can become mono-directional. This poses two related dangers for the 
district‟s development. The first is the district becomes vulnerable to 
economic factors affecting the core firm(s). This is particularly the case where 
the district over-specialises by focusing upon meeting the technological 
requirements of the core firm(s), thus raising the possibility of technological 
isomorphism whereby the district fails to significantly diversify and adopt 
more flexible technologies (Bailey, 2003)
6
. The second danger relates to 
governance and is more fundamental in that the district‟s development path 
becomes entwined with the ramifications of the core firm‟s strategic-
decisions. For instance, a strategic decision (or even a threat) by a core firm to 
                                                 
5
 This is often the case in automotive clusters where local suppliers are typically required to 
meet the stringent demands of transnational assemblers. In the Japanese automobile industry, 
for instance, small keiretsu subcontractors were often subjugated to the demands of Japan‟s 
large auto-assemblers (for further details, see Coffey and Tomlinson (2003a and b)).  
6
 The danger here is that in extreme cases, shifts in demand may render the entire industrial 
base obsolete (Helmsing, 2001). 
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shift production overseas and/or pursue a global outsourcing strategy will 
have significant repercussions for the district‟s smaller firms, workers and the 
skills base which will alter the district‟s development trajectory (see Section 
(4)) .  
 
The second case is described as one of „networks of mutual dependence‟. The 
main characteristic of this network is of a relatively „flat‟ or „heterarchical‟ 
governance structure, whereby firms are engaged in a series of ongoing 
economic relationships with each other, which are such that their mutual 
interdependencies – such as their dependence upon each others‟ resources and 
activities – tend to support and re-enforce co-operation, reciprocity and 
mutually supportive actions across the network (which might involve firms 
across the district) (Powell, 1990). Indeed, it is the mutual dependence of 
these interactions which tends to reduce the dominance of any one particular 
firm, thus maintaining heterarchy and promoting pluralism in the decision-
making processes (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003).    
 
In elaborating upon this concept, let us consider Jessop‟s (1998) three forms 
of heterarchical governance. In its simplest form, heterarchy arises through 
interpersonal networking, whereby individuals discuss, share and pursue a 
similar set of interests, interactions which can nurture and re-enforce trust in 
relationships. The second form of heterarchy is at an institutional level, 
whereby autonomous but interdependent organisations (such as firms) co-
ordinate their resources in the pursuit of a set of common objectives. In the 
aggregate, these mutual ties can evolve into collective competences and 
strengths that outweigh those of any one particular firm or organisation (see 
also Richardson, 1972)
7
. The third form of heterarchy is inter-systemic 
steering or communication, where actors engage in ongoing dialogue and 
                                                 
7
 It is worth noting that the importance of „collective competencies‟ for local economic 
development was initially raised by Richardson (1972) who - drawing upon a Penrosian view 
of the firm - recognised the value in firms developing „network competencies‟, through 
coordinating their own activities and utilising the expertise of others within the network. 
Pitelis and Pseiridis (2006) have since made the observation that the Penrosean entrepreneur 
is able to identify those particular activities which necessitate cooperation through the 
network.     
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negotiation
8
. For Jessop (1998) this process serves the dual purpose of i) 
„reducing noise‟ since it promotes a greater mutual understanding and 
sensitivity between different organisations, in particular in relation to each 
other‟s respective identities, operations and interests and ii) re-enforcing self 
restraint among actors as they become more aware of the wider impact of their 
own actions (and decision-making) on other parties.  
 
As Jessop acknowledges, these forms of heterarchy are not always easy to 
supervise. For instance, trust within inter-personal relations may be difficult to 
manage and maintain as networks grow, while co-ordinating resources 
between organisations is problematic, particularly where resource synergies 
are not easily transparent and individual organisations are inert in adapting to 
changing circumstances. Yet, the three forms of heterarchical governance 
should not be considered as being mutually exclusive, but rather as co-existing 
and supportive of each other. For instance, interpersonal relations can form 
the basis for inter-organisational co-ordination, which in turn, supports (and is 
supported by) inter-systemic communication, with all forms of heterarchical 
governance being underpinned by trust, mutual understanding and the 
stabilisation of expectations (ibid 37). The strength of such relationships is a 
measure of the „structural embeddness‟ of the network (Granovetter, 1992) 
which are supported by social mechanisms to maintain some form of social 
order. These social mechanisms can include collective sanctions where 
participants maybe ostracised by others if they engage in opportunism or 
breach accepted norms and/or reputation effects where reliability and 
commitment among participants is rewarded. In uncertain environments, such 
mechanisms can provide stability by safeguarding network relationships and 
exchanges between firms, while over time the reciprocity of such ties can lead 
to the emergence of a „macroculture‟ of shared visions and values, with 
clearly defined standards of behaviour (Jones et. al, 1997).  
 
Perhaps the clearest example of heterarchy within a „network of mutual 
dependence‟ is Beccattini‟s (1990) model of the Italian industrial district. The 
                                                 
8
 For an analysis of the differences between negotiation and deliberation in governance 
processes see Sacchetti and Sugden (2007b).  
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distinctive feature of the Italian district is that of a localised and yet 
fragmented production system, where there is a wide availability of buyers 
and suppliers and an efficient skilled labour market, supported by a set of 
publicly funded research and social institutions, including shared habits and 
behavioural rules. The districts‟ competitive advantage was based upon the 
repeated interaction, joint actions and reciprocal relationships between firms. 
The transparency, fluidity and adaptability of such exchanges has been seen as 
providing all firms involved in the production process with the flexibility to 
deal with both changing output demands and varying product mixes, often at 
short notice (De Propris, 2001). Furthermore, the repeated interaction between 
firms - with its knowledge and information exchanges – has been regarded as 
the source of new (collective) learning opportunities and spin-off ideas for the 
districts‟ ongoing development (Maillet, 1995).  
   
Of course an over-emphasis upon co-operation and consensus building within 
districts can occasionally impede the emergence of creative tensions and 
constrain crisis-resolution. This can be particularly problematic in times of 
economic turbulence, where quick and immediate solutions maybe required 
(Jessop, 1998). Resolving such dilemmas is not easy, and will depend upon 
the nature of the dyad between firms, the extent of their mutual 
interdependence and their joint commitment and determination in reaching 
solutions that are not taken to the benefit of dominant interests despite the 
impact on others.  
 
3.0 Evolution, economic governance and the development path of districts  
 
The economic governance structure within a district reflects the composition 
of its firms and the dyadic nature of its inter-firm relations. These are not 
stationary but will evolve over time as firms enter/exit the district and there 
are changes in the nature of (and control of) technology. These changes will, 
in turn, affect a district‟s development path. A scenario which is now typical 
of many traditional industrial districts (see also Section 4) is illustrated in 
Swann‟s (1998) cluster life cycle model. According to Swann, a district‟s 
dynamism (and growth) begins to tail off once congestion costs and the 
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increased competition between firms (in both input and output markets) within 
a district begin to outweigh the benefits of agglomeration. In such cases, entry 
levels begin to stabilise and then eventually fall. As the district matures, there 
is consolidation as weaker firms exit or are taken over by larger rival firms. At 
this point the district begins to resemble the „networks of direction‟ model as 
economic power and strategic decision-making become more concentrated 
within the leading firms.  
 
A particular issue here relates to the concentration of technology within the 
leading firms, which acts not only as an entry barrier, but also affects the 
nature of technological change and the degree to which knowledge spillovers 
occur within the district. In the first instance, Nelson (1998: 325-326) argues 
that innovation is likely to shift predominantly in favour of developing 
process technology, which depends upon firm size and away from pursuing 
product innovations, which relies upon the number of competing firms. On the 
one hand, lower average costs through improvements in production processes 
can improve the leading firms‟ competitiveness and thus prolong the life of a 
district. On the other, the lack of product development and diversity might 
hamper the district‟s ability to tap into new markets and cater for changing 
consumer demands. Secondly, it is argued that the concentration of 
technology among a few large firms is unlikely to generate significant 
spillovers to attract new firm entry (Swann, 1998: 54). The failure to attract 
sufficient new entrants then adversely affects the district‟s dynamism while 
the control of technology among a few firms can also lead to over-
specialisation and „lock in‟ within the district (see Section 2). Furthermore, as 
such technology matures and the benefits of agglomeration diminish further, 
leading firms may begin to relocate or sub-contract part of their production 
chain to low-wage areas thus exacerbating decline.   
 
For Swann (1998), such an outcome is not inevitable and revival is possible if 
mature districts can attract sufficient new entrants into new (possibly related) 
industries to compensate for the exit (and also decline) of mature incumbents. 
This is likely to occur when there is convergence between old and new 
technologies within the district. Swann and Prevezer (1996), for instance, find 
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that in UK and US computing clusters, there are strong cross-sectoral links, 
whereby the established hardware sectors acted as a stimulus for new entry by 
software firms, able to exploit existing technologies in hardware. Where old 
technologies can be adapted to meet new demands or where synergies exist 
with new technologies, then this becomes attractive to new entrants and the 
district‟s life-cycle can be extended9. New entry, of course, will again alter the 
composition and diversity of firms within the district and may again lead to a 
more diffuse governance structure and a different development path.  
 
The issues raised here hold a particular resonance with the challenges 
currently facing traditional industrial districts, in particular those relating to 
the saturation of their traditional markets, the growth in low-cost international 
competition and moves by leading district firms towards global outsourcing 
strategies which undermine the district‟s ability to retain and also attract firms 
(see Section 4). One response to these challenges is that districts should avoid 
„low road competition‟ and instead focus upon the „high road to development‟ 
through technological upgrading and higher value added activities (Pyke and 
Sengenberger, 1992; Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001). However, while 
exploring the possible synergies between old and new technologies offers 
opportunities for industrial renewal, identifying where these synergies may 
arise within districts is problematic and can invoke the rather old and staid 
policy debate on industrial targeting and „picking winners‟ (Pitelis, 1994). It is 
perhaps useful in this regard to recognise that cross-sectoral links are more 
likely to arise in districts which have a more diversified (and flexible) 
technological base (Swann, 1998).  
 
In widening the technological base, „networks of mutual dependence‟ may 
therefore hold a particular appeal. It can be argued that the ability of firms to 
participate in strategic decision-making processes is linked to the development 
of competences at both the firm and local level and that wider participation in 
the production process may in turn encourage knowledge creation and 
                                                 
9
 A related issue here is for the district to overcome any inherent „conservatism‟, inertia or 
resistance to change within incumbent firms which can lead to missed opportunities for 
revival (Nelson, 1998, Winter, 2005).    
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diffusion. In this vein, Sacchetti and Sugden (2008) suggest that within and 
across a network, a commitment to creating and using knowledge and the co-
ordination of this process can differ significantly according to the network‟s 
governance structure. For instance, in the absence of hierarchy, a network of 
mutual dependence is more likely to have an interest in developing shared 
bodies of knowledge that enable each and every actor to participate in joint 
production activities on equal terms. On the contrary a network of direction, 
based upon unequal relations, may have little interest in sharing such 
knowledge. Indeed, its core organisation might prefer such knowledge to 
remain hidden since it strengthens its hold over its strategic options and 
capabilities, particularly in relation to technological change.   
 
For example, consider again the case of Italian industrial districts, some of 
which it is argued have been moving towards a „leadership‟ model in which 
technology transfers from the lead firm to its suppliers. Some observers have 
viewed this as a desirable trend because, it is argued, the leader can stimulate 
modernisation across the district, taking it towards new competencies and 
higher competitiveness (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999; Brioschi et al, 2002; 
Guerrieri and Pietrobelli, 2004). However, more caution might be required.  A 
leader model - a network of direction – would significantly bring the strategic 
function of deciding what knowledge has to be created and who should access 
and use it more in the decision-making sphere of a core firm, whose role and 
therefore objective is to determine network strategy. Were it to do so, there is 
nothing in the model that would require the decision-making leader to 
(continue to) take account of the wider, public interest (such as 
(re)development) within the district (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2008). 
 
4.0 Economic Governance and development in two mature industrial 
districts  
 
There are signs in some European policy circles that economic governance is 
becoming a more significant issue, particularly in old traditional industrial 
districts which, faced with the challenges posed by globalisation and industrial 
restructuring, have been evolving towards the „networks of direction‟ model. 
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For instance in the case of the North Staffordshire ceramics district a report by 
the West Midlands Regional Development Agency (North Staffordshire 
Taskforce (2003, Section 2.9)) observed that „whilst funding constraints will 
always arise, a key issue to address is that of governance, both within the 
private and public sectors… This issue is pivotal to an understanding of both 
the problems and opportunities of North Staffordshire‟. In the textile industry, 
prior to the abolition of trade restrictions in 2005, governance issues had 
begun to underpin European Union directives, suggesting the desirability for 
SMEs to build network linkages, joint ventures, cooperative agreements, or 
undergo mergers as a way to promote the sector‟s competitiveness, as well as 
the social responsibility of business with respect, for instance, to 
environmental and labour issues (See European Commission Directive, 1997, 
and COM, 2003).   
 
With this in mind, we now consider the implications of changes in economic 
governance for the development paths of i). the North Staffordshire ceramics 
district and ii). the Prato textile/clothing district. This comparison flanks the 
recent evolution of a real industrial district as described originally by Marshall 
(the potteries) with a „Marshallian‟ one (textiles), as theorised by Becattini 
(1990). Although current policy suggestions seem to encourage further 
concentration within districts, these two case studies offer a perspective on 
different trajectories and strategic choices in the organisation of production.  
In Prato, strategic decision making still appears to be diffused across the 
district, but in North Staffordshire, a few larger firms have captured the 
district‟s governance. While our case studies predominantly draw upon 
secondary data and also the existing literature, this is supplemented with some 
qualitative observations from a small pilot study carried out during the latter 
half of 2007 and in early 2008. In the case of North Staffordshire, interviews 
were conducted with representatives from the British Ceramics Confederation 
(based in the district), while managing directors/operations managers of 
district firms were also invited to express their opinions on the issues of 
governance and development within the district. Although only a few 
comments were received, they tended to confirm some of the feelings for 
these issues in the district as reported in the literature and we include some 
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appropriate comments to provide a flavour to our case evidence. In the case of 
Prato, qualitative insights come from interviews with directors in either 
research or economic development areas inside two of the major business 
associations located within the district: Confartigianato Prato, mostly 
representing small craft firms, and Unione Industriale Pratese, typically 
representing medium and large firms. Discussion addressed issues of 
governance within the district, mainly with respect to the presence and role of 
large firms and group formation, as well as perspectives on future directions 
development possibilities. 
  
4.1 The North Staffordshire Ceramics District  
 
4.1.1 Background 
 
The North Staffordshire ceramics district is one of the UK‟s oldest industrial 
districts, with commercial production dating back to at least the late 17
th
 
century. Since then, the district has acquired an international reputation in the 
design and manufacture of high quality ceramics with some firms (and famous 
brands), such as Aynsley (established 1775), Minton (1793), Wedgwood 
(1759) and Spode (1780), having a long history and association with the 
region. Indeed, ceramics shaped the industrial heritage, the landscape and the 
social fabric of the North Staffordshire region, while it also provided long-
standing employment for generations of the local population (Whipp, 1990). 
Today, ceramics remains the region‟s largest industrial employer directly 
accounting for approximately half of all manufacturing jobs in the locality 
(Source: Stoke on Trent City Council 2007). The district also remains the 
nucleus of the UK ceramics industry, with the headquarters of the main 
industry bodies - the British Ceramic Confederation (BCC) and the Ceramic 
and Allied Trade Union (CATU) - and various ceramic research centres being 
based in the region
10
.  
 
                                                 
10
 The other main industry bodies whose headquarters are in North Staffordshire are the 
Association for Ceramic Training and Development, the British Ceramic Plant and Machinery 
Manufacturer‟s Association, CERAM Research and the Ceramic Industry Forum. 
 14 
4.1.2 Economic governance within the district 
 
For a long period in its history, the district was propagated with family owned 
firms (and family brands) and very much resembled a traditional Marshallian 
industrial district. During the 1960s, the district‟s industrial structure began to 
change as a period of rationalisation resulted in a series of mergers and 
acquisitions and led to many family firms being amalgamated and/or taken 
over by larger ceramic companies. While the rise in industrial concentration 
occurred across all of the industry‟s major sub-sectors (electrical ware, the tile 
sector, sanitary ware and table and giftware) it was most marked in the 
traditionally „competitive‟ and for North Staffordshire, strategically important 
table and giftware sector
11
. For instance, in 1963, the leading five firms 
accounted for 32% of the UK table and giftware market but by 1970, a 
significantly more concentrated structure had emerged with three firms 
supplying two-thirds of the market (see Gay and Smyth, 1974). The recent 
takeover of Royal Doulton by Waterford Wedgwood in 2005 means that over 
70% of the UK market is now controlled by one group (Keynote, 2007). And 
while the district still retains a significant small firm ceramics base, such 
enterprises are largely peripheral with little impact on the overall market (or 
upon employment levels) – indeed many commentators have long described 
such firms as being little more than „survivalists‟, employing strategies that 
merely enable them to „keep their heads above water‟ (Rowley, 1998).  
 
Since the early 1970s, the district has evolved towards a more hierarchical 
mode of economic governance with the fortunes and corporate strategies - on 
investment, employment and output - of the larger firms having a major 
impact upon the „shape‟ and „direction‟ of the district. A related issue is that 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the district‟s larger ceramics firms began to move 
further away from their local roots by obtaining public listings, effectively 
transferring strategic decision-making processes from local businessmen to 
more distant city and institutional shareholders. Since the late-1990s, many of 
                                                 
11
 The table and giftware sector accounts for 35% of industry output and 62% of total industry 
employment and 84% of all ceramics workers in the North Staffordshire travel to work area 
(Ecotec, 1999).  
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the larger ceramics firms in the district have been acquired by foreign owners. 
The concentration of strategic decision making among the corporate 
hierarchies of a few core firms has been particularly significant for the 
district‟s development.    
 
A particular concern in this respect and put forward by Padley and Pugh 
(2000) is that since the mid 1970s there has been a re-focusing of strategic 
(corporate) objectives within the larger ceramics firms towards one of 
satisfying the short-term profitability demands of external institutional 
shareholders, which has often been at the expense of long term investment and 
capacity building within the district. According to Padley and Pugh, the 
district‟s larger ceramics firms have tended to be too eager to divest during 
cyclical downtowns (often cutting back on more innovative areas of business 
operations) in order to improve their short run return on capital to satisfy 
institutional shareholders. It is claimed this has hastened decline at the district 
level, since in subsequent upturns the district has had insufficient (domestic) 
capacity to meet rising demand, leaving a void that has often been filled by 
foreign imports and more recently by UK firms using global outsourcing (see 
below). Padley and Pugh compare this situation with an earlier period in the 
district‟s history, where they suggest that independent and family owned firms 
often undertook a longer-term perspective of the cycle and invested 
accordingly, which enabled them to take advantage of subsequent upturns. 
Similar sentiments are also expressed within the district:  
 
„For the last thirty years or so, the (UK) ceramics industry has been 
too corporate in its focus and increasingly distant from its local 
roots. This has hardly been a success – some of the big firms are 
now in trouble, while the district‟s development has largely been 
ignored. The most successful time of our industry was when there 
was independent family ownership (e.g Spode, Doulton, Johnson 
etc). Maybe there is a lesson there for the industry‟s future 
development?‟ (Managing Director, Small Tableware Company).  
 
Concerns have also been expressed about the impact of the transfer of 
strategic decision-making powers outside the district: 
 
„Most of the larger UK ceramic companies are now owned by parent 
companies outside the UK. As such they have different agendas for 
their UK manufacturing operations and these are not always in line 
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with the long term interests of the district‟ (Operations Manager, 
Sanitary Ware Manufacturer).   
 
 
4.1.3 Impact of Globalisation and Global Outsourcing 
 
As in other European industrial districts in recent years, the main challenge to 
the North Staffordshire district has come from globalisation and competition 
from the low wage economies of East Asia. Initially, the main impact of this 
international competition was upon the high volume, low value added part of 
the table and giftware market (Day et.al (2000: 10-11)), although in recent 
years foreign competition has begun to penetrate the more lucrative, medium 
to upper end of the market. UK manufacturers have seen foreign competition 
impinge upon both their traditional export markets (predominantly in North 
America and Japan) and crucially their own share of the UK market. Indeed 
since the late 1990s, the UK‟s traditional trade surplus in the table and 
giftware market has been in continual decline. From a surplus of £216.3 
million in 1996, it entered into deficit for the first time in 2004, with a £467.4 
million deficit being recorded in 2005 (Keynote, 2003, 2007).  
 
The response of the larger ceramic manufacturers has been to pursue a 
strategy of global outsourcing, utilising their own production facilities in the 
Far East. The impact of these strategic decisions – combined with greater 
foreign competition - has led to the closure of a number of factories and 
significant job losses within the district. An indication of the decline in 
employment is given by the dwindling membership of the ceramics trade 
union (Unity) which fell from approximately 21,800 to 7,200 between 1996 
and 2006
12
. There have been a number of high profile cases, most notably 
Waterford Wedgwood‟s decision to close two of its North Staffordshire 
factories, with a loss of over 1,000 jobs, and the complete transfer of the 
production of its Johnson Brothers brand to China (Staffordshire Evening 
                                                 
12
 Data obtained from Unity (previously known as CATU) and the Annual Return for Trade 
Unions, lodged with the Certification Office for Trade Unions and Employer Associations. 
The data is a useful indicator of the decline in employment since union density in ceramics is 
approximately 100% (Carroll et al. 2002)).  
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Sentinel, 4/6/2003) and (preceding its merger with the Wedgwood group) the 
closure of Royal Doulton‟s last factory in North Staffordshire with production 
being transferred to facilities in Indonesia (Staffordshire Evening Sentinel, 
26/3/2004). Moreover, many established smaller district firms have found it 
difficult to remain cost-competitive in the global market and have 
subsequently left the industry
13
.  
 
The growing uncertainties concerning employment have in turn contributed to 
a gradual erosion of the district‟s skills base. Industry surveys have 
consistently reported that displaced (skilled) workers are often reluctant to 
remain in (or return to) the ceramics industry (see Ceramic Innovations (2003: 
16)), which has become regarded as having a „poor image, soured by one of 
insecure and unpredictable employment and a sense of pessimism‟ (Keynote, 
2003: 17). Initially some firms adopted a policy to only outsource work to 
other firms within the district so as to protect the skills base. However, 
tightening (labour) cost pressures have meant that global outsourcing has 
become more attractive and such (horizontal) collaborative arrangements have 
been in decline (see also Carroll et.al 2002). For the district the growing skills 
shortage is a serious problem since it raises the region‟s average costs and 
reduces the overall competitiveness of the remaining firms, thus limiting the 
opportunities for long term development.  
 
One of the district‟s inherent strengths is its long standing reputation for 
ceramics products, with the Staffordshire trademark remaining a valuable 
marketing tool. However, there are concerns this trademark is being devalued 
by the practice of „back-stamping‟, whereby some larger district firms have 
been producing their wares overseas and placing „A Made in 
Staffordshire/England‟ transfer on the finished product at their North 
Staffordshire factory:  
 
„The good name of UK ceramics is being eroded by UK 
manufacturers outsourcing production and not identifying the 
country of production. Moreover, it makes it increasingly difficult for 
                                                 
13
 For instance, between 2001 and 2006, the number of registered table and giftware firms fell 
by approximately 40% (Keynote, 2007).  
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those of us manufacturing solely in the UK to compete on a level 
playing field‟ (Managing Director, Small Giftware manufacturer).   
 
The legalities of back-stamping are often complicated and controversial 
(Carroll et. al 2002) and have yet to be resolved. Proposals for a Mark of 
Origin „back-stamp‟ to be applied where products are originally „fired‟ so as 
provide consumers with greater information and ensure „fairer‟ international 
competition (and reduce counterfeits) are currently under consideration at the 
European Commission.   
 
4.1.4 Recent Policy Initiatives  
 
In response to the challenges facing the North Staffordshire district, there have 
been calls for district firms to adopt a more co-operative approach to business, 
with a greater degree of inter-firm networking and collaboration, particularly 
in innovation and joint marketing activities and also to form closer links with 
higher education and research institutions. It has also been recognised that to 
meet the challenge of international competition, firms need to continually 
focus upon improving design, while being more proactive in seeking new 
markets.  
 
There has been some progress. The „Hothouse‟ project is a publicly funded 
ceramic shape and pattern design centre, equipped with the latest 3D printing 
and prototype technology, along with CAD and CAM tools. It is a centre of 
excellence which enables users to bring new designs to the market more 
quickly and is intended to serve the whole district, with all firms being able to 
take advantage of the centre‟s facilities (for a set fee) and expertise, without 
incurring the high sunk costs associated with investing in specific 
technologies. Such initiatives can facilitate mutual learning and cross-
fertilisation of ideas (Morosini, 2003)
14
. In terms of other networking 
opportunities, the district has continued to promote a series of trade fairs, most 
notably the annual Stoke Ceramics Festival. However, suggestions for the 
                                                 
14
 As always there is the public goods issue of „access‟ to such facilities, and there is always a 
danger that larger firms might „crowd out‟ smaller firms, as in the case of the Japanese Public 
Testing and Research Centres (see Ruigrok & Tate, 1996).  
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establishment of a co-operative forecasting, marketing and distribution service 
to serve the whole district (see Ecotec Report, 1999) have not been pursued.  
This is somewhat disappointing since smaller firms in the district often lack 
the expertise or resources to market and sell products on an international level. 
Yet, collectively there are significant scale economies that can be obtained in 
such activities, which could benefit the whole district (Brusco, 1982).  
 
In order to promote new district start-ups, the new Millennium saw funding 
from the North Staffordshire Regeneration Zone channelled into establishing a 
small number of enterprise units exclusively for small art and design 
entrepreneurs. The aim has been to modernise the ceramics district through 
the promotion of a design ethos, small business start ups and the nurturing of a 
creative industries network. The units are based around historically renowned 
sites for design such as the Burslem School of Art and the Roslyn Works, in 
Longton. However, while some of the units have been taken up by graduates 
in art and ceramic design (and also some displaced designers from the larger 
ceramics manufacturers), on the whole the occupancy rate of these units has 
been low, with some units now being let to businesses outside the creative 
industries (see Jayne 2004). The envisaged network of small scale designers 
and producers has not yet materialised. Indeed overall, the district has failed to 
attract significant levels of new entrants to compensate for the exit of existing 
firms or been able to attract new firms in related sectors in order to extend its‟ 
life cycle (see discussion in Section 3 and Swann, 1998). However, some 
remaining firms have begun to diversify their operations promoting the use of 
ceramics products in industry, such as roof tiles, X-ray equipment and thermal 
imaging devices, which may offer future profitable opportunities. 
 
In summary, recent trends have raised serious concerns about the long-term 
prospects for the North Staffordshire ceramics district, with long-standing 
regional ties and the social fabric of the region becoming particularly 
vulnerable (Carroll et al. (2002: 341)). Many smaller firms in the district have 
been left isolated as the larger firms have take advantage of global 
outsourcing, while declining employment levels have created greater 
uncertainty and have begun to erode the district‟s skills base. Over the last 
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four decades, it appears the strategic interests of the larger ceramics firms and 
the corporate sector have taken precedence over the long-term development of 
the North Staffordshire district. It remains to be seen whether recent initiatives 
will be sufficient to reverse these trends.   
 
4.2 The Prato textile district  
 
The North Staffordshire case highlights the vulnerability of old traditional 
clusters to global forces when production activities become concentrated 
among a few large firms. There are also concerns that a similar situation is 
emerging in the Prato textile and clothing industrial district in Tuscany, one of 
Italy‟s oldest and most celebrated „industrial districts‟. But has the Prato 
district evolved in the same direction as North Staffordshire?  
 
The region was originally famous for the manufacture of its high quality 
woollen fabrics, production traditionally taking place in small family owned 
firms and also within small „phase firms‟ - firms specialised in one or two 
phases of the production process that gives rise to a complex and yet flexible 
system of „interconnected local phase markets‟ mostly undertaking 
subcontracting activities. In addition, design and marketing activities have 
traditionally been undertaken in small „final‟ firms. With regards to economic 
governance, the district has historically exercised a „collective voice‟ in 
determining its development path, embracing many of the principles 
associated with the „networks of mutual dependence‟ model as described in 
Section (2.2), (see Dei Ottati, 2003). 
 
Recent statistics show that after 30 years of expansion (from 1950 to 1980), 
Prato has, in line with other European textile industries, undergone a long 
period of economic rationalisation. While Prato‟s industrial re-structuring has 
been relatively less severe than its European neighbours,
15
 the region has, 
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 Since the early 1980s, other European textile and clothing regions, such as Nord Pas de 
Calais in France, Tilburg in the Netherlands, the North West of England and Baden-
Württemberg in the South-West of Germany have also undergone significant industrial 
restructuring with resulting falls in employment levels. Indeed, throughout the EU, between 
1980 and 1995, the decline in employment was 47% in textiles and 40% in clothing (Stengg, 
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nevertheless, experienced a significant decline in both textile employment and 
the number of firms operating within the district. Between 1991 and 2001 
Prato‟s employment in textiles16 continued to fall, losing 5.5% of its 
workers.
17
 The decrease has occurred in activities related to spinning (-5.4%) 
and mainly weaving (-30.7%), whilst textile finishing and „making-up‟ have 
counterbalanced this decline with increases of 7% and 20% respectively. 
Previous analysis emphasised that changes in the upper phases may also be 
related to the opening up of district to phase firms located elsewhere within 
Italy, but also to increasing levels of imports of intermediate products 
manufactured where the cost of labour is lower (Dei Ottati, 1996). Over the 
last 25 years, reorganisation has in part reshaped the geography of production 
relationships and although subcontracting still occurs mainly within the 
district, final firms are increasingly contracting with phase firms located 
outside the district (ibid.).  
 
The clothing sector
18
 has also undergone a major reduction both in terms of 
firms – with a decline of 41.7% between 1991 and 2001 - and employment, 
which fell by 32% over the same period.  Changes in consumer demand for 
clothing has also had an impact upon the organisation of production, 
shortening the times for orders and production, and led to alternating phases 
of underutilisation of plants with periods of excessive strain on capacity.
19
  
 
Following these trends, questions have been raised as to whether the „district‟ 
characteristics that have long underpinned Prato‟s prosperity are now being 
eroded. Increasing globalisation and low-cost foreign competitors, who are 
able to compete with new designs and high quality products, have placed 
                                                                                                                               
2001: 3). Over the same period (1981-1996), Prato has experienced a more moderate 30% fall 
in both textiles and clothing (ISTAT, 2004). 
16
 ISTAT statistics refer to the province. The textile sector includes the following groups of 
activities: spinning (171), weaving (172), textile finishing (173), making-up (174), other 
textile industries (175). 
17
 According to the 2001 national industrial and services census (ISTAT, 2004), employees in 
the textile sector in the Prato province were 29,147. In 1991 the figure was 30,845.  
18
 ISTAT statistics refer to the province. The clothing sector includes the following groups of 
activities: manufacturing of knitted fabrics (176) and manufacturing of knitwear articles 
(177). 
19
 In textiles, the utilisation of plants in subcontracting firms has declined impressively as 
compared to the early „90s, falling to 69% in 2003, although since 2006 it has raised to 74% 
(CCIAA Prato and Unione Industriale Pratese, 2003 and 2008). 
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Prato‟s textile industry under pressure. This pressure has intensified since 
2005, with the ending of import quotas on textiles and clothing, which were 
introduced in 1974, under the WTO supervision. The response in Prato has 
been, in part, a move towards greater consolidation within the district, with 
the amalgamation of groups of firms and an ongoing rationalisation in 
employment.
20
 However, this process has been quite different from the 
situation in North Staffordshire.  
 
4.2.1 Prato‟s changing economic governance  
 
Although authors emphasise a tendency to group formation (Brioschi et al. 
2002) or the desirability of leadership (Guerrieri and Pietrobelli, 2004) within 
districts, the industrial structure in Prato is rather distinguished, specifically 
with respect to the role of leader firms.  While there are differences between 
the textile (where indeed a few medium-sized firms stand out) and the 
clothing sectors, it is acknowledged that: 
 
“…the district in Prato is still characterised by a very high 
fragmentation in terms of ownership and in the textile sector even core 
firms producing fabrics or spun yarns do not reach very high levels of 
turnover (only a few exceeds 50 million euros).” (Team Director, 
Business Research Unit, Unione Industriale Pratese) 
 
However, the question on what sort of governance changes underlie, or are 
most likely to underlie declining traditional sectors in Europe remains open. 
Whilst we could marry the view according to which Marshallian industrial 
districts‟ qualities are responsible for the relative ability of districts to hold 
their ground in an enlarged competitive scenario, it should also be recognised 
that the structure of Italian industrial districts varies in important ways across 
regions. A national study undertaken by Brusco and Bigarelli (1995) in the 
first half of the 1990s on the clothing and knitwear sector emphasised 
differences in terms of both governance and strategies across regions. 
                                                 
20
 Since the mid-1980s, the number of textile firms registered within the Prato district has 
halved, while employment levels have fallen by a third (ISTAT, 2004 and Unione Industriale 
Pratese, 2007).    
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Veneto
21
 (in the North-East of Italy) and Tuscany (where Prato plays a major 
role with respect to clothing and textiles) were presented by the authors as 
opposite extremes. Veneto, in the North-East of the country, was characterised 
by large integrated firms, producing average to high quality products and 
distributed through franchising chains or independent retail shops. In contrast, 
Tuscany is populated by small non-integrated firms producing average to low 
quality garments that are then distributed by wholesale dealers and large 
distribution. Different from Veneto, where production is mainly planned, 
Tuscany‟s production system was regarded as being built upon flexibility 
(ibid.). 
 
This lack of an “explicit head” governing production is rooted in the recent 
history of the Prato district
22
:   
 
“to govern implies to manage the district, and the district 
never was managed. Rather, it was the sum of different, not to 
say opposite, strategies that gave direction. As vector sums, 
different strategies built up without a unified logic, but across 
diverse logics that emulation, less problematic markets, as 
well as the enormous confusion of that context made it look as 
if that there was a „single direction‟, whilst there was, instead, 
a myriad of different directions.” (Team Director, Economic 
Development Unit, Confartigianato Prato) 
 
In these respects, socially accepted patterns of behaviour, as well as the 
trustworthiness and the reputational credentials of actors have played an 
important role (see Piore and Sabel, 1984 amongst others) in framing the 
context within which a collective „spontaneous order‟ could emerge. Whether 
this has been a realistic perspective or not, however, changes in market 
dynamics now seem to threaten the system‟s ability to coordinate the myriad 
of different actors populating the district. Lazerson and Lorenzoni (2000) 
argued that at the end of the 1990s the restructuring of the district was not that 
spontaneous or alternatively coordinated by the public sector, but orchestrated 
                                                 
21
 Veneto presents an interesting case also with respect to the eye-wear industry in Belluno, 
which is mainly dominated and led by one single firm. Camuffo (2003) has analysed how the 
leader firm structure has overcome the pre-existing local small firm based production. 
22
 In strike contrast, between 1800 and 1950 the district was dominated by one large and 
vertically integrated mill (Lorenzoni, 1979; Dei Ottati, 2003). 
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by “no more than 50 leading firms, which together accounted for no more than 
25 percent of the total value of production” (ibid. p. 369) and which were in a 
position to organise production for 6,000 firms. As one of our interviewees 
points out while explaining the changing economic scene faced by smaller 
firms:    
 
 “Today, the fact that we are facing an increasingly exiguous 
number of firms makes previously hidden logics manifest, 
reinforced also by the scantier number of job orders placed in 
the district and on which the attention of those who are left 
concentrate.” (Team Director, Economic Development Unit, 
Confartigianato Prato) 
 
 
A reason why this occurred relates to the peculiarities of the textile and 
clothing sectors. The growth of larger firms has gone hand in hand with 
diversification into distribution, marketing, and other related activities that 
generate scale economies which are not related to manufacturing, and that still 
contribute substantially to the redefinition of the structural characteristics of 
firms. On this basis, the clothing sector as well has witnessed the emergence 
of a few more successful medium-sized firms and more are undergoing a 
process of transition. If on the one hand distribution and marketing are 
manufacturing-related activities in which a few growing firms specialise, on 
the other hand, specifically for the clothing sector, Prato‟s reality is coupled 
by the fast growth of micro-firms, associated with the consistent presence of a 
Chinese community of entrepreneurs based upon cheap labour.  
 
With a declared presence of 10,000 people (probably 30,000 in reality), the 
Chinese constitute 5% of the inhabitants of Prato (population 190,000 people). 
The number of firms owned by entrepreneurs of Chinese origin is growing. If 
we could count about 1500 firms (Ceccagno, 2003) at the turn of the Century, 
today they are 2400 (Corriere della Sera, 2007) Although these firms are 
mainly micro size subcontractors, there are cases of more structured small 
firms which have become prime contractors outsourcing their work not only 
to other Chinese firms but to other district firms outside their ethnic 
community (this is done for highly specialised craft work and design) (ibid.). 
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However, the presence of Chinese subcontracting firms is controversial. 
Indeed, it would be interesting to explore in more depth the sort of 
subcontracting operations that are evolving in the district, with respect, for 
instance, to (a) the use subcontractors of Chinese origins, who eventually 
operate under working conditions that might cross the borderlines of legality, 
and (b) global outsourcing to take advantage of lower production costs, a 
situation that is expected to continue with further technological advances in 
Asia and which will place even further pressure upon Prato‟s district firms to 
compete on wage costs. The exploitation of „sweatshop conditions‟, in 
particular, has raised concerns among the wider community of local producers 
and policy-makers that Prato‟s wider „social‟ interests are being compromised 
in favour of a popular but debated concept of „competitiveness‟ (See Bristow, 
2005). Moreover, the increased emphasis upon lowering labour costs – either 
within the district or through global outsourcing - would little to enrich the 
district‟s ability to re-launch its activities into new diversified and higher 
value added product lines. 
 
Some findings on the nature of linkages amongst firms that belong to district 
traditions have been more recently presented in Sacchetti (2008). In particular, 
this analysis shows that both the informality of relationships and other 
arrangements such as equity holdings coexist. As linkages are firm specific, 
each firm, given its relational abilities, can build multiple relationships 
characterised by more or less formality. The mix can vary over time, 
according to firms‟ strategies (ibid.). As one interviewee points out:  
 
“Obviously, one thing is the legal nature of the individual firm, 
another is the perspective offered when looking at ownership links 
(groups) and, last but not least, the industrial organisation and 
networking angle. With respect to the latter (the most qualitative 
aspect and, therefore, the most difficult to investigate) we observe a 
tendency towards enduring relationships and participation in strategy-
making amongst final firms and phase firms (in critical phases such 
as, for example, textile finishing). This is inevitable within a 
framework – for those firms who compete from Italy – where what 
counts is creativity (including the related aspects of research and 
innovation), quality/reliability, reaction-time to market changes, etc. 
Not necessarily these sorts of more solid relationships are cemented by 
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equities.” (Team Director, Business Research Unit, Unione Industriale 
Pratese) 
 
 
The coexistence of formal and informal relationships requires different 
management and might be chosen, talking about informal linkages, to allow 
greater flexibility when, because of environmental uncertainty and 
complexity, relationships rely on socialisation rather than market or 
bureaucratic control (Palpacuer, 2000; Ouchi, 1980). However, the degree of 
informality/formality in relationships is by no means defined once and for all. 
Firms might choose to redefine their position with respect to partners, perhaps 
building on mutual trust as it emerges over time, on learning and on 
knowledge complementarities (Parrilli and Sacchetti, 2008). The evolution of 
relationships may either originate specific routines or – when relationships are 
centred on input customisation and idiosyncratic assets – the need to set up 
new contractual arrangements (e.g. through the creation of formal agreements 
or by exchanging proprietary assets). Highly specific assets require 
commitment and internal co-ordination, whilst competence complementarities 
in production may require external co-operation. Both alternatives (internal 
direction or external co-operation) – as Langlois (1998, p. 192) observes - 
imply some sunkness: one relates to the sunkness internal to the firm; the 
other refers to the degree of specialisation of activities with respect to others. 
The higher the level of external sunkness and commitment between the prime 
contractor and the subcontractor, the more we can expect equity ownership to 
become the governance mechanism to govern relationships. Dei Ottati (1996), 
for instance, pointed out the peculiar nature of group-like linkages in 
Tuscany‟s industrial districts, where ties based on ownership are the 
culmination of enduring relationships that have been building up over time 
and serve the purpose of institutionalising linkages to support investment 
coordination and risk sharing. This, it was suggested, does not have to be 
necessarily interpreted as a trend towards an increased concentration or 
hierarchical control in the district, but rather as a form of „bilateral 
governance‟, where equities represent a sort of guarantee to reciprocity 
amongst firms (ibid.), a requisite that is possibly reinforced by increasing 
market pressures. 
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4.2.1 The challenge for policy in Prato 
In these respects, the nature of the relationships between prime contractors 
and subcontractors can define the governance of the district. Following the 
increasing tendency to import semi-finished goods and to outsource outside 
the district, the debate between the main economic actors has pointed to the 
difficulties of small enterprises: namely craftsmen who are mainly committed 
to subcontracting activities. Recurrently, researches undertaken in recent years 
by business associations have emphasised two distinguished sets of economic 
expectations: more positive for prime contractors, whilst revealing negative 
prospects for subcontracting firms (CCIAA Prato and Unione Industriale 
Pratese, 2005). Phrasing Prato‟s reality in terms of the „two districts‟ does not 
seem to relate as before to textile or clothing, but rather to the distinction 
between contractors and subcontractors, between those who retain the ability 
to design, market and distribute their products and those who do not. These 
capacities have been mainly developed by medium- to large-sized firms which 
may or may not choose to outsource to local producers. Conversely, crafts and 
small enterprises have been thinking of „imitating‟ their larger colleagues by 
finding new orders and competences in marketing and distribution related 
areas by networking outside the district (La Nazione, 2005). Playing the 
devil‟s advocate, it could be argued, indeed that in terms of the resilience of 
the entire local economic system, the „threat‟ of looking for partners outside 
the district‟s borders could bring to an unnecessary conflict between the „two 
districts‟. As long as firms, whatever their size, are able to network with 
complementary organisations under specific governance conditions, outside 
linkages could become a source of strength rather than a threat to the district. 
Needless to say, whether smaller firms have this ability is a big „if‟ and this is 
where we would call for collective action in „building them up‟.         
 
Consistently with the multiplicity and variety of linkages that firms can put in 
place, and the theoretical perspective presented in Section (2), we suggest that 
the nature and degree of dependence of subcontractors on core firms‟ 
strategies can be considered a more complete indicator of the governance 
structure of production systems than legal ownership. Pyramidal forms of 
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governance can emerge with or without ownership concentration, as long as 
there is assimilation of strategic decision-making power by one actor over 
others. The high substitutability of specialised subcontractors with similar 
characteristics or the emergence of sweatshops, especially in clothing, could 
give more space to relationships based on direction.  
 
Conversely, joint coordination of production choices, based on an intentional 
will of partners to collegially pursue specific objectives, requires sharing 
resources in terms of values and motivations, time, knowledge, and capital. 
Relationships based on real complementarities may create dependence as a 
result of specialisation and „external sunkness‟. However, provided that the 
governance of the relationship allows for an effective „voice‟ mechanism to 
address strategic choices and contingent problems, the reciprocal commitment 
is likely to favour participation in decision making rather than a hierarchical 
principal-agent relational dynamic (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003).  
 
In these respects, the ability to take – to some extent – strategic direction can 
be, in principle, associated with the ability of firms to set up proactive 
strategies rather than with size, although the two might be related. The main 
characteristic of the Prato district is still a decentralised system of production 
where, however, firms‟ choices and opportunities might differ, depending on 
the governance of their network. The challenge for a district like Prato, where 
a multiplicity of prime contractors and subcontractors seem to endure, where 
network relationships increasingly span across localities and linkages may 
vary in the degree of formality and commitment, is to beware not only of the 
number and size of firms in the district, but of the essence of their 
relationships.  
 
The evolution of the district seems to rely essentially on the interaction 
between firms, policy makers and intermediate actors. In Prato the role of 
industrialist and craft associations has always been central in supporting the 
activities of small and medium size enterprises providing services, 
representation at political level, and facilitating firms‟ access to opportunities 
opened up by policy strategies. Over recent years, incentives have been put in 
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place to stimulate firms‟ internationalisation and growth by means of mergers, 
acquisitions and alliances (through networks and consortia). Subcontracting 
firms have been targeted through the development of a data base that 
facilitates networking (for further details, see Regione Toscana, 2003). 
 
Recent law proposals to support networking within industrial districts favour 
group formation and equity participation, in an attempt to inject more 
resources into the firms that populate the district. Very recent initiatives do 
not stem directly from public administration, but from one of the major banks 
in Tuscany (Monte dei Paschi di Siena) to provide resources and coordination 
within the district. With this project, which started in 2008, the bank provides 
strategic and financial support and, substantially, becomes a stakeholder in the 
district, providing funding but also voice in defining the district‟s strategy. 
More specifically, the intention is to boost firms‟ opportunities in diversifying 
both their market and their technological base, possibly allowing for a positive 
turn in the district‟s life cycle, as theorised by Swann (1998) (see Section 3).  
Whether these actions will promote networks based on mutual dependence 
rather than direction might be too soon to say, but much will depend on the 
ability of firms and the public to engage within this new framework by 
maintaining their voice in the strategic choices regarding production.   
 
5.0 Concluding comments  
 
In this paper, we have highlighted the importance of economic governance for 
the development of industrial districts. The issue of governance matters in that 
those who control an industry or district‟s strategic decisions effectively 
determine a region‟s long term economic development path. Both our case 
studies exemplify successful districts of the past which have recently become 
vulnerable to competition from lower-cost producers, particularly those based 
in East Asia. In essence, the global market has played a major role in 
transmitting evolutionary change, generating important variations in the 
characteristics of the population of firms and the governance structure within 
traditional districts by inducing the exit of smaller producers and by re-
shaping inter-firm relations. It appears that the „tradition of familialism‟ long 
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associated with traditional (particularly Italian) industrial districts (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984: 228) is being replaced by more structured and hierarchical forms 
of economic governance.  
 
In the case of North Staffordshire, the evolution of a more concentrated 
industrial structure, since the 1960s, appears to have contributed to the 
district‟s gradual decline. The increasingly corporate and strategic interests of 
the larger ceramics firms have neglected the district‟s longer term 
development, in particular in relation to new investment, capacity and the 
skills base. Unfortunately, recent policy initiatives – while commendable - to 
promote greater networking and small firm start-ups within the district may be 
too late and are unlikely to provide a significant impact in the face of 
globalisation. In Prato, where inter-firm relationships are more entrenched and 
have traditionally been governed along more heterarchical lines, the situation 
is more complex. While there has been greater consolidation and a growth of 
larger firms operating within (and outside) the district, there appears to lie, 
among the new and emerging myriad of inter-firm linkages, possibilities for 
some continuation of the ability of actors to exercise a „collective voice‟ in 
strategic decision making processes. At the district level, such opportunities to 
widen participation might be useful in determining future development paths 
within the district, and in particular avoiding some of the problems faced in 
North Staffordshire.            
 
Finally the evolution of global markets and local industrial structures, in 
particular where there has been a growth in large firms and group formation, 
seems to call for a parallel change in the institutions supporting industrial 
development. Indeed, as noted in Section (3), the development of new 
practices and activities, coexisting with changing traditional ones is a viable 
but demanding challenge and one which requires the co-evolution of 
technology, industrial structure, and supportive institutions (Nelson, 1998). It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this issue in further detail, suffice 
to argue that the experience of our two case studies would suggest a careful 
approach in managing the diffusion of any new technologies and practices.  
Policy measures, whilst keeping an eye on governance structures in old 
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sectors, should focus upon the emergence of new firms in different sectors 
particularly those with links to traditional sectors, as well as the network of 
organisations surrounding their own emergence and evolution. Policy efforts 
in this direction would imply wider choices at the strategic decision-making 
level with respect to knowledge issues, such as what knowledge is to be 
created and by whom, who should benefit from this knowledge and how. 
Given the experiences in our two districts, that decision – we suggest – should 
not be an exclusive prerogative of large firms dominating the region.  Rather, 
the role of institutions should be one of creating adequate conditions for the 
district – as a collective entity – to thrive. This would imply that potentially all 
firms (whether prime contractors or subcontractors, whether belonging to the 
traditional sector or to emerging ones) to be able to access and develop new 
opportunities, whilst keeping a role in shaping strategies. Institutions might 
therefore represent a meeting point between the private objectives and actions 
of firms and the future prosperity of the district.   
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